Presentism and brain timing their role in time perception

 Summary 

Presentism and brain timing explore how cognitive and emotional factors can alter our experience of time. This work will present an overview of the neuroscientific study of timing and brain synchronization processes. We’ll see how these processes have different dimensions and how they all need to function correctly for perception, attention, memory, movement, and higher cognitive processes (like decision-making, abstraction, discrimination, generalization, calculation, or reading).

The second part will explain what the presentist philosophical theory is, how it differs from the eternalist theory and the limitations of both models. We’ll also present some works that have tried to overcome the limitations of the pure or classic presentist model.

Finally, we’ll reflect on how current knowledge of brain timing prevents us from adopting either of the preceding antagonistic models (presentism-eternalism) and how we need to postulate a nuanced presentist model. This model would allow for the coexistence of an abstract, but real, past and future that depend on a current present, in which the individual’s capacity for action in the environment is preserved.

1. Introduction to brain timing

Timing and brain synchronization (brain timing) are essential for the brain to function properly. This work starts from the basis that the different dynamics of the physical and mental world have modeled, throughout evolution, a series of temporal patterns in the brain, which we can now measure, although not yet fully understand (Fenlon, 2022: 8). Presentism and brain timing play crucial roles in time perception, influencing how we experience the passage of time and interact with our environment. All these brain dynamics, which must be appropriately coordinated, include processes that occur in individual neurons to much broader synchronizations that include several brain regions (Fenlon, 2022: 17).

Although we still have much to learn about how patterns of neural activity contribute to different brain functions, the main topics of brain timing research include:

Neuronal oscillations: These are the rhythmic activities of neurons that occur at different frequencies, as we’ll see in point 1.1 of this work. These oscillations are thought to be important modulators of attention, perception, and memory (Kösem, Gramfort, & van Wassenhove, 2014: 274, 279).

Synchronization: Neurons in different brain regions coordinate their activity, both temporally and spatially. This process is vital for perception, attention, and communication between brain regions (Golombek & Rosenstein, 2010: 1090).

Temporal coding: Neurons coordinate their activity to transmit information about sensory input, motor output, and internal processes (Zeldenrust, Wadman, & Englitz, 2018: 1).

Neuronal plasticity: Brain synchronization and timing mechanisms adapt to environmental changes, learning, and development (Dan & Poo, 2004: 28).

Dysfunction in brain timing can lead to disorders like autism, schizophrenia, Parkinson’s disease, ADHD, and epilepsy (Piras, et al., 2014: 2).

Neurotransmitters and neuromodulators control brain timing. They affect neuronal oscillations, synchronization, temporal coding, and neuronal plasticity (Brzosko, Mierau, & Paulsen, 2019: 575).

These are just a few key research topics in cerebral timing. This field is constantly evolving, so new areas of study may emerge in the future. The following subsections will explain these processes in more detail.

The oscillations neural

Neural oscillations are rhythmic patterns of neuronal activity that occur at different frequencies. These oscillations are measured using techniques such as electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG), which record the electrical or magnetic activity of the brain, respectively. Neuronal oscillations can be classified into different types of waves, depending on their frequencies:

  • Delta waves (0.5-4 Hz): These are the slowest type of oscillation and are typically associated with deep sleep.
  • Theta waves (4-8 Hz): These oscillations are generally associated with light sleep and drowsiness.
  • Alpha waves (8-12 Hz): These oscillations are typically associated with a relaxed, awake state, and are believed to be involved in attention and perception.
  • Beta waves (12-30 Hz): These oscillations are generally associated with a state of alertness and concentration and are believed to influence cognitive processing and motor control.
  • Gamma waves (30-100 Hz): These are the fastest type of oscillation and are believed to be important for perception, attention, and cognitive processing (Carlson, 1998: 281).

Researchers have also observed these neural oscillation patterns in numerous regions of the brain and at different stages of development, suggesting that the same neural oscillations may play diverse roles in each part of the brain and at each stage of life (Fenlon, 2022).: 8-9).

It is also believed that neuronal oscillations play a prominent role in different cognitive processes, such as perception, attention, memory, and learning because they coordinate the activity of different neuronal networks involved in the previous processes (Carlson, 1998: 276-278).

Finally, it is known that they can also play a role in communication between different regions of the brain, allowing the integration of information from different sources. Furthermore, it has been seen that interruptions in neuronal oscillations can contribute to the appearance or intensification of different neurological disorders (Kösem, Gramfort, & van Wassenhove, 2014: 279).

Brain synchronization

Refers to the coordination of neuronal activity between different regions of the brain. This synchronization can occur both in time and space (Golombek & Rosenstein, 2010: 281-282). Presentism and brain timing are integral to understanding how these synchronization processes influence our perception of time, which in turn affects various cognitive functions. It is believed that temporal synchronization is important for the correct functioning of different cognitive processes, such as perception, attention, memory, and learning. For example, when neurons in different regions of the brain fire in synchrony, it allows the integration of information from different sources, which can improve the accuracy and efficiency of cognitive processing (Golombek & Rosenstein, 2010: 1087-1090).

On the other hand, spatial synchronization is also believed to be important for communication between different regions of the brain, allowing the integration of information from different sources. For example, researchers have observed that neurons in different brain areas fire in synchrony when an animal is performing a specific task, such as reaching for an object (Penny, Kiebel, Kilner, & Rugg, 2002: 389).

There is also evidence that disruptions in synchronization can contribute to the emergence of some neurological disorders, such as autism (Wang, et al., 2020: 112), Alzheimer’s disease (Babiloni, et al., 2020), schizophrenia (Koshiyama, et al., 2021), Parkinson’s disease (Mano, Kinugawa, Ozaki, Kataoka, & Sugie, 2022) and epilepsy (Matsubara, et al., 2018).

Brain synchronization can be measured in several ways, for example by recording and comparing the phase of neuronal oscillations or the degree of correlation between activity in different regions. Neuroimaging techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), are also used to visualize the activity of different brain areas (Sun, Li, & Tong, 2012: 1).

In general, brain synchronization is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. It is believed to be of crucial importance in several cognitive processes. Therefore, understanding their mechanisms and dysfunctions can help us better understand different neurological disorders and design more effective therapies.

Temporal coding

 

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Temporal coding refers to the process by which information is encoded at the time of neural activity. This means that the timing of neuronal spikes (the electrical signals that travel through neurons) conveys information about the stimulus the brain is processing. Presentism and brain timing play significant roles in temporal coding, as they help to frame our understanding of how the timing of neural activity affects our perception of time and events. This may include spike synchronization in individual neurons or populations of neurons (Zeldenrust, Wadman, & Englitz, 2018: 1).

One of the best-studied examples of temporal coding is found in the auditory system, where neurons in the auditory cortex are sensitive to the precise timing of sound waves. Neurons in the auditory system fire in response to specific characteristics of a sound, such as its frequency or loudness, and the timing of these spikes conveys information about the sound being processed (Carlson, 1998: 208).

Temporal coding is also observed in other sensory systems, such as the visual system, where neurons in the visual cortex are sensitive to the precise timing of visual stimuli (Rucci, Ahissar, & Burr, 2018: 883). Furthermore, temporal coding is also believed to be important in motor control, where precise synchronization of neural spikes is necessary for good synchronization of movements (Steuber & Jaeger, 2013: 112). Temporal encoding is generally believed to be crucial in several cognitive processes, such as perception, attention, and memory because it allows the brain to extract and process information from the environment with high temporal precision (Rucci, Ahissar, & Burr, 2018: 885).

Researchers study temporal coding by measuring the synchronization of neural spikes in response to different stimuli, as well as by measuring the responses of populations of neurons to these stimuli. They also use computational models to simulate how neuronal populations might encode information when performing these spikes of activity (Zeldenrust, Wadman, & Englitz, 2018: 9).

Overall, temporal encoding is a key mechanism by which the brain processes information and understanding its underlying mechanisms can provide relevant information about the transmission of sensory and motor information, and how this brain functioning can malfunction. and cause different disorders.

Time and neuronal plasticity

Time and plasticity are closely related concepts in neuroscience. Plasticity refers to the brain’s ability to change and adapt in response to experience and learning (von Bernhardi, Bernhardi, & Eugenín, 2017: 1).

Time is known to play an important role in various forms of brain plasticity. For example, Hebbian plasticity, which is a form of synaptic plasticity thought to underlie learning and memory, is mediated by the precise timing of neuronal spikes (von Bernhardi, Bernhardi, & Eugenín, 2017: 9). In fact, it has long been known that neuroplasticity is involved in a wide range of changes, at different levels of the nervous system (von Bernhardi, Bernhardi, & Eugenín, 2017: 2).

From this previous idea arises the concept of spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP). STDP is a form of synaptic plasticity that occurs when the timing of a spike firing in one neuron is closely related to the timing of a spike firing in another neuron. This process is believed to be involved in the formation of neural circuits that are involved in various cognitive processes, such as perception, attention, and memory (Dan & Poo, 2004: 23). Furthermore, time is also believed to be crucial in the process of neuronal development, because the precise moment at which neuronal activity occurs during the life cycle of an individual determines whether adequate development of neuronal circuits will occur (Fenlon, 2022: 11).

Overall, time and plasticity are closely related concepts that play a crucial role in the brain’s ability to change and adapt in response to experience and learning. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of synchronization and plasticity gives us information about how the brain processes information and how some deficiencies in its functioning arise that can end up causing some functional disorders.

Dysfunction of timing and brain synchronization

The representation of time is necessary to make predictions and estimates between events and between these and the responses that we must issue. Presentism and brain timing are fundamental to this representation, as they shape how we perceive time and influence our decision-making processes.

In short, the perception of time helps us interpret reality (Piras et al., 2014: 1). Brain timing dysfunction refers to disruptions in normal patterns of neuronal activity that are believed to be important in the development of various neurological and psychiatric disorders. Researchers have observed disruptions in neural oscillations, synchronization, and temporal coding in a variety of disorders, including:

Autism: Studies have found that people with autism have disruptions in neural oscillations and synchronization in several regions of the brain, particularly in the default mode network (DMN) and the brain network specialized in the social interaction of the individual. Alterations in neuronal oscillations and synchronization can cause deficiencies in social interaction and communication, which are characteristics of autism (Fenlon, 2022: 25).

Schizophrenia: Studies have found disruptions in neuronal oscillations and synchronization in several brain regions, particularly the frontotemporal network, in people with schizophrenia. These disruptions can lead to cognitive dysfunction and abnormal perception, which are hallmarks of schizophrenia. Specifically, people with schizophrenia tend to show worse results in tasks of estimating the time spent during speech, discrimination of time intervals, time spent on motor tasks, and production of time intervals (Piras, et al., 2014: 2).

Parkinson’s disease: Studies have found disruptions in neuronal oscillations and synchronization in the basal ganglia, a region of the brain that is important for motor control, in people with Parkinson’s disease. These disruptions in the brain’s time processing can contribute to the motor symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, such as tremors, rigidity, and difficulty initiating movement. Parkinson’s patients receiving medication often make errors in motor tasks that require discrimination of temporal intervals or that must divide temporal intervals into two equal parts (temporal bisection) (Piras, et al., 2014: 2). On the other hand, alterations in time perception in unmedicated Parkinson’s patients are even greater. These patients show difficulties in generalizing temporal durations to other tasks, performing temporal bisection tasks, estimating speech duration, remembering the duration of a task, constantly pressing a key, and estimating the duration of a temporal interval (Piras, et al., 2014: 2).

Epilepsy: Studies have found disruptions in neuronal oscillations and synchronization in the hippocampus, a brain region that is important for memory and spatial orientation, in people with epilepsy. These disruptions can contribute to seizures, which are the hallmark of epilepsy, and cognitive dysfunction, such as memory deficits. Alterations have been found both in absence epileptic seizures in children (Cainelli, Mioni, Boniver, Bisiacchi, & Vecchi, 2019: 4), and in adult patients with generalized seizures (Farooq & Fine, 2017: 5).

Huntington’s belt: these patients show difficulties in estimating the duration of a motor interval and in discriminating between different intervals in various sensory modalities (Piras, et al., 2014: 2).

Alzheimer’s disease: Studies have found disruptions in neuronal oscillations and synchronization in several brain regions, particularly in the default mode network (DMN), in people with Alzheimer’s disease. These disruptions may contribute to cognitive dysfunction, such as memory loss, and changes in brain functional connectivity, which are hallmarks of Alzheimer’s disease (Pai, Yang, & Fan, 2021: 4).

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: these patients show difficulties in performing motor tasks (such as pressing a key at certain intervals), and in discriminating, performing, and reproducing temporal intervals (Piras, et al., 2014: 2).

These are some examples of disorders in which dysfunctions in cerebral timing have been observed, but the field is constantly expanding and evolving. However, it is important to note that the relationship between cerebral timing dysfunction and these disorders is complex, so more research is needed to fully understand the underlying mechanisms.

Neuromodulation of cerebral time

Neuromodulation of cerebral timing refers to the regulation of neuronal activity by neurotransmitters (chemicals that are released so that signals can be sent from one neuron to the next) and neuromodulators (chemicals that are released to vary the effectiveness of impulse transmission between neurons), which can affect cerebral timing. Neuromodulators can have a wide range of effects on neuronal activity, including altering neuronal oscillations, synchronization, and temporal coding. For example:

Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that is involved in a wide range of brain functions, including motor control, reward, and motivation. Studies have found that dopamine can modulate neuronal oscillations and synchronization in the basal ganglia, a region of the brain that is important for motor control, and whose functioning is often affected in Parkinson’s disease (Fung, Sutlief, & Shuler, 2021: 6).

Acetylcholine is a neurotransmitter that is involved in various cognitive processes, such as attention, learning, and memory. Studies have found that acetylcholine can modulate neuronal oscillations and timing in the hippocampus, a brain region that is important for memory and spatial orientation. These skills are often impaired in Alzheimer’s disease (Sugisaki, Fukushima, Nakajima, & Aihara, 2022: 5972).

Serotonin is a neurotransmitter that is involved in regulating mood, anxiety, and sleep. Studies have found that serotonin can modulate neuronal oscillations and synchronization in the frontotemporal network, a region of the brain that is involved in cognitive processes. Patients with schizophrenia usually show deficits in the functioning of these cognitive processes (Wittmann, et al., 2007: 50).

Gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA): GABA is an inhibitory neurotransmitter that regulates the activity of neurons in the brain. Studies have found that GABA can modulate neuronal oscillations and synchronization in various brain regions in patients with autism (Terhune, Russo, Near, Stagg, & Kadosh, 2014: 4364).

These are just a few examples of the many neurotransmitters and neuromodulators that can affect the temporal functioning of the brain. Researchers are still working to understand the specific mechanisms by which these chemicals modulate neuronal activity and how this modulation relates to specific brain functions and disorders.

2.What is presenteeism?

Presentism is the philosophical current that defends that only the present exists (Markosian, 2004: 47), while the past or the future do not have a real entity. Sometimes, what exists in the present is called real, while what existed in the past “was” real and what will exist in the future “will be.” This is what common sense tells us and can be expressed with the idea, defended by presentism, that there is a real and objective present that forms a kind of three-dimensional continuum. Presentism, in conjunction with concepts of brain timing, emphasizes how our perception of time is intricately tied to our immediate experiences and cognitive processes.

The passage of time or becoming is a continuous transformation that occurs throughout the universe from an instant of present three-dimensional and objective time to another instant of three-dimensional and objective time (Rovelli, 2019: 1325).

On the contrary, eternalism defends that events of the past and future exist eternally, so they are equally real. For this doctrine, reality is composed of a four-dimensional continuum, and the passage of time or becoming is not real, but rather an illusion (Rovelli, 2019: 1325-1326).

While presentism considers the present moment to be a privileged place from which we can change the course of events, eternalism shows a more static conception of becoming. Time exists for eternalists, but ‘now’ does not have any privileged place in existence, but rather is just another moment in a space-time continuum (Dainton, 2013: 383).

Defenders of the presentist doctrine are often actualists, that is, they consider that everything that exists is in the act, while what is possible is simply an idea or theory that lacks a real entity. On the contrary, eternalists tend to also be possibilists, because they defend that there are things, beings, or events that are not current, so there can be types of existence that occur only in the past or in the future (Sider, 1999: 2).

Presenteeism presents some problems, for example: (1) how can we explain that it is hot in this room by claiming that we turned on the heater an hour ago? (2) Or, how can we say that Benito Pérez Galdós wrote the National Episodes? (3) Or establish a kinship relationship between my great-great-grandmother (who passed away long before I was born) and me who is living now? The past no longer exists; therefore, it is not clear how it may be affecting the present (1), or how, from the present, we can refer to events from the past (2) or how to establish relationships (kinship or any type) (3) with events or facts from this past.

The same type of limitations can be found when referring to the future. For a presentist, to say that if the heating breaks down this weekend, it will be cold, or that in the next century, there will be a robot president of the government in my country, or that my grandson, if he is a boy, is also likely to be color blind, because I am. These are all statements that have no real foundation because they refer to a future that does not exist.

However, we all know that the past, present, and future outline a common thread from which it is difficult to escape. What happened in the recent and remote past marks, sometimes decisively, our current existence. Likewise, we consider that what we do in the present will somehow affect future events. This moves us to act and change what we consider could be improved.

To overcome the weaknesses that have been discussed in this section of the “pure” presentist doctrine, some of the modifications of this theory that have been proposed in recent years will be explained below.

Models that modify the initial presentist theory

As we have seen, the main idea of presentism is that at this moment there is an objective and real three-dimensional present that extends throughout the universe. This present is formed by the union of all the events that are “real now.” As time passes, the present becomes the past, and future events become the present. This is what becoming consists of (Rovelli, 2019: 1326). On the contrary, in eternalism, all four-dimensional space-time would be equally real at this moment, and becoming is only an illusion (Rovelli, 2019: 1328).

Presentism presents numerous philosophical and scientific problems. For example, if all space-time is real now, as eternalism defends, and there is no becoming, there is also no free will and, therefore, freedom. There is only the illusion of change and the illusion of freedom. The world is not dynamic, everything that was, what is, and what will be already exists at this moment (Rovelli, 2019: 1328). However, we, as observers of the world, feel that we have freedom and that things are happening around us. Therefore, it is somewhat forced on our intuition to consider that future and past events are real at this moment, as eternalism defends. However, as we have seen, presentism also presents numerous problems, so, below, some proposals will be explained that try to formulate presentism in a nuanced way to solve its limitations.

In 1999, Sider considered that “presentism must not completely reject ordinary speech and thought” (Sider, 1999: 7). Specifically, Sider believed that there are phrases like “dinosaurs populated the earth” or “Lincoln was tall” (Sider, 1999: 3-4) that we cannot say are true because neither dinosaurs nor Lincoln exists. Today, they are not real. Since only the present exists, any statement we make about past events is about events or entities that lack existence, and, therefore, our statements cannot have the character of truth. However, presentism “should save something from what we usually say” (Sider, 1999: 7). Sider believed that, although there are indeed phrases that we cannot consider true within the framework of presentism, this does not prevent us from granting a certain positive value to these statements, so that we do not end up falling into a skepticism that is difficult to justify (Sider, 1999: 8). Therefore, he defended that, if these statements are not true, they are at least “almost true.” For this author, an “almost-truth” is a statement that we cannot consider to be true (from presentism) but that would be true if eternalism were true (Sider, 1999: 18). All non-present objects and events would fall into this category, and these types of sentences would share many of the characteristics of true statements. Even for ordinary life, they could be considered true statements (Sider, 1999: 23). In this way, in the author’s opinion, ordinary thoughts and statements would be respected from presentism (Sider, 1999: 24). However, if we have to consider what would happen if eternalism were true to decide whether a statement is true from presentism in quasi-truth form, why not directly accept eternalism as the most valid option?

Also trying to overcome the difficulties of pure presentism, a few years later, Markosian (2004) proposed another distinction. For this author, from presentism, the veracity of singular propositions (that is, that depend on an object for them to make sense) could not be accepted if they are formulated concerning objects or events not present (for example, “Socrates was a philosopher” (Markosian, 2004: 49). Nor would it make sense to affirm that “I am an admirer of Socrates” since I am referring to something or someone (Socrates) that does not exist (Markosian, 2004: 50). However, for Markosian, there is a subtle difference hiding in these statements. The previous sentences can have two possible truth conditions: they can be understood as “graspable truth conditions” (grabby truth conditions) or as “search truth conditions”. In the first case, it is about apprehending what we currently call “Socrates” and then going back to see if there is a time in the past when Socrates was a philosopher. On the contrary, from the perspective of the conditions of truth sought, one must go to the past and look for some reference to “Socrates” and see if he was a philosopher (Markosian, 2004: 70). For Markosian, the condition of truth sought would be acceptable from the point of view of presentism, because in the past there could have been someone named Socrates who was a philosopher. However, the condition of graspable truth would not be acceptable (because it would be false or without a truth value) from presentism, given that there is no one named Socrates today who was a philosopher. However, for this author, this graspable truth condition is the only one that should be considered correct because it is how sentences are understood in English (Markosian, 2004: 71). That is, when speaking in current English, it is assumed that “Socrates” is something or someone that we can refer to from the present (it is a somewhat graspable concept, of which we are looking for some kind of entity now). However, if we consider that Socrates does not exist, but could have existed in the past (a sought-after truth condition), these types of statements would make sense, even from presentism.

On the other hand, for this author, there are two worlds, an “abstract current world” and a “concrete current world”, which is the sum of all current events (facts). The concrete world is the only one that exists and that makes the current abstract world (made up of maximal and consistent propositions) real. Therefore, there is an abstract present tense (which contains consistent and maximal propositions) and a concrete present tense that is formed by the total of all present events (facts). Only concrete time exists, and it is what makes the abstract present time real (Markosian, 2004: 76). Both abstract worlds and times are not real in the strong sense of the term, they are not composed of matter, they are rather “ways in which things could be” (Markosian, 2004: 77). Finally, there are other non-present abstract tenses that are also consistent and maximal propositions that may be or have been true, but that are not the reality in the present. However, there is only one specific time, the present time, which is the total of all events (Markosian, 2004: 78-79). For Markosian, therefore, “there are not worlds, in the robust sense of the term”, that is, worlds made of matter, but rather abstract objects that constitute “ways in which things could be” (Markosian, 2004: 79).

Two years later, Bourne (2006) studied presentism considering that “contingent truths require truthmakers.” Truthmakers theory studies the relationships between what is true and what exists. This theory is based on the fact that for something to be true, it must exist, or in a more formal way: the truth contained in truth-bearing statements depends on the existence of truth-makers. That is, for the phrase “the tree has no leaves” to be true, a tree that does not have leaves (truthmaker) must exist in the real world; only then will the phrase (truth bearer) be true. Therefore, if there are sentences formulated in the past tense that are true, they will need truthmakers, but where can we find those truthmakers from the presentist perspective? (Bourne, 2006: 2). If we say that Socrates was Plato’s teacher, and we think that reality only exists in the present, how can we say that this phrase is true if neither Socrates nor Plato exist? This leads us to consider that there is some type of “dark ontology” (Bourne, 2006: 4).

Plantinga (1974: 70) referred to this type of existence as “essence”, so that the terms Socrates and Plato do not refer to flesh and blood beings of the present moment, but to essences that refer to them. According to Plantinga “Objects and individuals exist in possible worlds, some, like Socrates, exist in some, but not in all possible worlds, and others, like the number seven, exist in all worlds” (Plantinga, 1974: 46).

However, Bourne (2006: 13) considers that time is an abstract concept, it is not a place or a moment in which we live. Rather, there are many times, but there is only one of them in which it exists in a concrete reality, the rest of the times are only potential (Bourne, 2006: 13). This way of understanding the present allows: us to make true statements about the past and try to explain what that dark ontology is like (it would be states of space and time that only exist potentially). Furthermore, many statements can be considered true and not just almost true (Bourne, 2006: 25), as Sider (1999) defended.

The previous works would conclude that, ontologically, we need something more than a directly observable present to rule out the existence of an eternalist universe (in which the present, past, and future coexist on the same plane of reality). It would even be possible to formulate a model in which presentism and eternalism were not mutually exclusive, but compatible, such as the one defended by the Italian physicist Carlo Rovelli.

For this author, our experience of reality is limited (Rovelli, 2019: 1326). Reality has a temporal structure, but to talk about something it is not enough to specify the time in which it happens, but it is also necessary to know its spatial location. For example, some things are real on Earth, that were or will be. But others are, will be, or were in another place in our galaxy, but that is not real for us. We should talk more about a “reality now and here”, instead of only a “reality now” (Rovelli, 2019: 1332-1333). In short, the present exists, it is not an illusion of our senses, but it always exists in a specific spatiotemporal location. The image we have of a four-dimensional (paternalistic) space-time would be nothing more than an extensive cartography of relationships between multiple local times (present) (Rovelli, 2019: 1334).

3.Presentist nature of time and brain timing

The nature of time is a complex and controversial topic that has been debated by philosophers, physicists, and cognitive scientists for centuries. Time is generally considered to be a fundamental aspect of the universe and is thought to be a continuous and irreversible flow. However, when talking about brain time, we are not referring only to an objective parameter, such as physical time, which can be measured and quantified externally. There is also a subjective dimension of time, that is, how it is experienced, and that is closely related to the neural activity processes that have been seen in point 1 of this work.

As we have seen, research on brain synchronization has shown that the synchronization of neural activity in the brain is closely related to various aspects of behavior, including perception, motor control, attention, and decision-making.

For example, when we see, there is not only a transmission of an electrical impulse from the retina to the visual cortex that correlates with the subjective sensation of seeing an external object. On the contrary, all the neural activity of the visual cortex and other parts of the brain is synchronized with the electrical impulse that is being generated in the retina, so that when this electrical impulse arrives it does so at the same time as many other processes related to memory, attention or cognition. In this way, the perception of time is crucial to launch many processes (and inhibit others) by anticipating, generating optimal operating conditions, creating expectations, and enabling change in the face of unforeseen or even dangerous events for survival. When these synchronization processes lose this delicate balance, some cognitive deficits become evident which we can observe in numerous neurological and psychiatric disorders.

In short, normal cognitive functioning requires the integration of different sources of information. For this precise integration and coordination to take place, a precise calculation or timing of different isolated neuronal processes is necessary, and of brain regions that, in turn, must adjust precisely to the demands of an environment, sometimes predictable, but many others changing or ambiguous for the observer.

The brain also makes these timing and synchronization changes in a complex way. Sometimes it records and manages processes lasting milliseconds, while at other times it engages in cycles that last weeks, months, or years. There is not only one internal clock, but there are also many. All of them with a precise objective, to adapt the individual to the demands of the environment in a precise way, making anticipations, using the knowledge acquired during experience, but always leaving enough flexibility to be able to adapt to change and project into the future.

Therefore, from the physical dimension of time in which events in the world occur, cerebral timing calculates, anticipates, interprets, and changes, so that the individual can be in tune with those changes in the world, to make his home, a place in which to develop his short-term actions, but also his life project. How does this relate to the presentist or eternalist nature of time?

Well, the brain not only measures what happens “now” (present), but also registers durations of events that extend over time, and that can last months or years. It can bisect that event to know what its midpoint is. And to predict what the duration of a future event will predictably be or what the duration of a past one was. All of this allows you to synchronize, predict, and integrate present information with past information.

The brain functions in the present, but its constitutive characteristic is to always be linked to what has already happened and what will happen. Only in this way can the fundamental aspects of cerebral timing explained in point 1 be understood. Therefore, from cerebral timing, it does not make sense to talk about pure presentism. There will always be some past and some future in us that overlaps with the present, that works as a catalyst for what the brain is doing now. It is as if the present, the past, and the future are merged in the now. Or as Rovelli (2019) would say, not only in the now but in the “here and now”, because there can be as many “now” as there are individuals who are in a specific place in the physical world.

There may be an actual present and a potential past and future, as Bourne (2006) argued. Or there may be a concrete world that is the only one that exists now, as Markosian (2004) defended, but this concrete world, in turn, is the support of an abstract world that needs the first to be real. In this case, the brain would act in the here and now, but all its processes would be like a kind of hologram in which numerous past and future “here and now” would also be superimposed. This would not be an eternalist point of view, because in this superposition not all the “here and now” would have the same real entity, but there would be a privileged present (current concrete world, present) and other abstract ones, also real, but superimposed on the first and that they need it to exist.

Bourne’s (2006) truth makers could be found in this abstract real world, depending on the concrete actual world. It would not be necessary to resort to a “dark ontology”, but rather the superimposed holographic model is already manifest here, in the functioning of the brain, with its processes that “last”, months or years, that are anticipated, that are rooted in past moments, who can detect unforeseen changes and modifying processes.

In this work, it is not possible to dwell on this holographic model of the brain or mind, although interested readers can obtain more information by reading the works of David Bohm, Dennis Gabor, or Karl Pribram, among others. What I would like to highlight here is that cerebral timing can only be understood from a reformulation of the pure presentist theory, which admits the coexisting reality of other abstract, possible, or potential worlds that, in turn, decisively modulate brain functioning.

Furthermore, in my opinion, the pure eternalist position would not be justified to explain brain functioning, because time is not an indistinguishable continuum, in which everything is already determined and “written” so that there is little room for freedom of action. The study of cerebral timing teaches us that perceived subjective time is not something rigid, but rather varies depending on the circumstances and even the intention of the observer. Our level of consciousness and attention causes us to perceive events with a longer or shorter duration (although the objective or external time to the individual is the same). And this is so, because the perception of time, which has a strong correlation with brain activity, is always oriented to improving our ability to relate to the world (in all its facets: physical, symbolic, interpersonal, etc.) in an efficient way. The present is elastic for us, it allows for improvisation, change, and adaptation. Therefore, the individual continues to have freedom of action. The present continues to have a privileged place in our existence, and this is something that pure eternalist theory has difficulty explaining. In summary, cerebral timing is aimed at enabling us with the ability to interact with the world in the present moment. How could this happen if the present did not have a privileged place in the world?

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